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Witherow v. State, Bd. Of Parole Comm’rs, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33
(September 20, 2007) 1
CRIMINAL LAW-PAROLE
Summary
This case is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a complaint that
challenged a parole board proceeding under Nevada’s Open Meeting Law.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting
State of Nevada’s Board of Parole Commissioners’ motion to dismiss. The court
concluded that parole board hearings were quasi-judicial proceedings and therefore
exempt from the Nevada Open Meeting Law requirements.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant John Witherow (“Witherow”) filed a complaint against Respondent, the
State of Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners (“the Board”), after Witherow was
denied parole.
Witherow, an inmate in state prison, had applied for parole in 2002. The Board
then sent notice to Witherow of his upcoming parole and also provided a general agenda
for the hearing, which did not provide a time for public comment. Witherow’s mother
and sister traveled to Nevada to attend the parole hearing, but the Board did not allow
them to comment.
In Witherow’s complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, he alleged that
because the Board’s agenda did not specify a period of public comment and the Board
refused to allow public comment, the Board violated the public comment requirement of
the Nevada Open Meeting Law.
The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss after examining the Open
Meeting Law’s legislative history and concluding that it did not apply to parole board
hearings because they were quasi-judicial in nature.
Discussion
When the district court considers matters outside of the pleadings, the Nevada
Supreme Court reviews a dismissal order granting a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss as
if it were and order granting summary judgment. 2 Because the District Court considered
matters outside of the pleadings, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the order de novo
as if it were reviewing a motion for summary judgment.
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The Open Meeting Law requires that public bodies give “clear notice of the topics
to be discussed” 3 and notice must provide an agenda denoting a period for public
comment. 4 However, judicial proceedings are exempt from the Open Meeting Law. 5
The Court has concluded that “[a] quasi-judicial proceeding is sufficiently akin to a
judicial proceeding to render it exempt from the open meeting law.” 6
Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.130 governs parole board hearings and requires that hearings
must be open to the public, victims must receive notice of upcoming hearing for relevant
prisoners, and victims must be allowed to submit documents and testify at the parole
hearings. 7 However, neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.130 nor any provision of Nev. Rev.
Stat. Chapter 241 expressly exempt parole hearings from the Open Meeting Law.
The Legislature passed S.B. 471 during the 2007 Legislative Session which
amends Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.130 to provide that parole release hearings are quasi-judicial
proceedings. Parole release hearings must remain open to the public, but S.B. 471 does
not confer the same rights created by the Open Meeting Law to persons with respect to
parole board hearings. Although S.B. 471 is not effective until October 1, 2007, it is
evidence of the Legislature’s intent to exempt parole hearings from the Open Meeting
Law.
Additionally, parole boards perform judicial functions when releasing prisoners.
The parole board’s discretion in granting or denying parole is similar to the trial court’s
decision to grant or deny probation. Therefore, because parole boards have traditionally
performed quasi-judicial functions, parole board hearings are quasi-judicial procedures.
Concurrence/Dissenting Opinion
Justice Hardesty, with whom Chief Justice Maupin agreed, concurred in part and
dissented in part. The concurrence/dissent agrees that parole hearings are exempt from
the Open Meeting Law because they are quasi-judicial proceedings. However, the
dissent proposes different criteria for determining what proceedings are quasi-judicial.
The Court ruled in Stockmeier v. State, Department of Corrections 8 that quasijudicial proceedings are those that provide “minimum” due process safeguards.
Therefore, any public bodies could implement due process protections, which would
change those proceedings into quasi-judicial proceedings, making them exempt from the
Open Meeting Law. To avoid this result, the dissent recommends overturning Stockmeier
to the extent that it relies on due process safeguards for determining if an entity is
3

Attorney General v. Board of Regents, 67 P.3d 902, 906 (Nev. 2003); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 241.020(2).
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NEV. REV. STAT. 241.020(2)(c)(3).
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See Nev. Rev. Stat. 241.030(4)(a).
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Stockmeier v. State, Dept’ of Corrections, 135 P.3d 220, 223 (Nev. 2006).
7
NEV. REV. STAT. 213.130.
8
135 P.3d 220.

performing a quasi-judicial function and instead rely solely on a “judicial function” test.
The “judicial function” test, already recognized by the Court, 9 relies on whether the
entity performs a judicial or quasi-judicial function to determine if a proceeding is quasijudicial.
Conclusion
Parole hearings conducted by the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners are
exempt from the Open Meeting Law because they are quasi-judicial proceedings.
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See Ragio v. Campbell, 395 P.2d 625, 627 (1964).

